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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. Did the court of appeals correctly hold that issues of material fact precluded summary
judgment?
II. Did the court of appeals correctly hold that whether a principal may be held liable for the
unauthorized acts of an agent based on the doctrine of apparent authority is a factual question?
OPINION BELOW
The unpublished memorandum decision of the court of appeals, Brgoch v. Harry, Case
No. 950238-CA (Utah Ct. App., filed April 18, 1996), is attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs filed their complaint in this action against Defendants Harry
and Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc., Linsco Financial Services, Inc. and Linsco/Private
Ledger Corporation (collectively referred to as "Private Ledger") on March 17, 1992. (R. 2-8)
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint, filed on December 31, 1992, alleged four causes of action
against Defendant Harry, including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, securities violations
and fraud.1 (R. 288-302) Brgoch and Isaacs also alleged that Private Ledger breached its
fiduciary duty to them, was negligent with respect to their accounts, and committed various
securities violations. (R. 288-302) The primary basis for the plaintiffs' allegations against
Private Ledger arose from the fact that Defendant Harry was an agent for Private Ledger and

defendant Harry is not a party to this appeal. Harry was subsequently convicted of criminal charges
arising from his actions in this case. State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Thereafter,
Harry filed for bankruptcy (R. 395) which was twice dismissed. Harry has agreed to be bound by the
ruling of the appellate court pursuant to an agreement between Plaintiffs and Harry and the order of the
court. (R. 834-36)

that Private Ledger bestowed authority on Harry. Because plaintiffs were harmed by Harry's
actions undertaken pursuant to the apparent authority bestowed upon him by Private Ledger,
plaintiffs asserted that Private Ledger was liable for Harry's actions. (R. 288-302)
After the deadline set by the trial court for filing pretrial motions had expired, Defendant
Private Ledger filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 405-07) In its motion for summary
judgment, Private Ledger argued that the statute of limitations for plaintiffs' claims had expired
and that Private Ledger was not liable for Defendant Harry's actions because Harry was acting
outside of Private Ledger's control and the scope of his authority at the time he committed the
acts which were the subject of this action. (R. 408-561) In response, plaintiffs argued that
disputed issues of fact concerning when plaintiffs discovered Harry's misconduct foreclosed
application of the statute of limitations. Furthermore, plaintiffs asserted that Private Ledger was
liable for Harry's actions because he was acting as an agent for his principal, Private Ledger,
and was acting under the apparent authority granted to him by Private Ledger. (R. 580-621)
Following a hearing on Private Ledger's motion for summary judgment (R. 676), the trial
court denied that portion of the motion that related to the statute of limitations but granted the
motion with respect to the issue of Private Ledger's liability for its agent's actions. (R. 666,
820-22) The trial court ruled that "The fact that Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of
defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes my opinion that one cannot be an agent of the principal
at the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent.

They are mutually

exclusive actions and terms." (R. 684, 848) Therefore, the trial court ruled that Private Ledger
was not liable for Defendant Harry's actions.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion and memorandum for reconsideration or, in the
alternative, for a new trial. (R. 682-701) Plaintiffs argued that the trial court's ruling was
2

contrary to existing law because it ignored the doctrine of apparent authority. Additionally,
plaintiffs asserted that disputed issues of material fact remained which precluded summary
judgment in the case.

(R. 682-701)

The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for

reconsideration. (R. 820-25) Two separate orders, one granting Private Ledger's motion for
summary judgment and the other denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration were signed by
the trial court on November 21, 1994. (R. 821-22, 823-24)
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to certify the court's orders as final and appealable. (R. 804-06)
However, counsel for plaintiffs and Defendant Harry stipulated to a dismissal of the action
against Defendant Harry. (R. 834-36) Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs then appealed.
In their appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court's ruling that Private Ledger was not
liable was contrary to existing law because it ignored the doctrine of apparent authority and that
issues of material fact regarding apparent authority precluded summary judgment.

In an

unpublished memorandum decision issued on April 18, 1996, the court of appeals held that the
trial court's reasoning to the effect that "one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time
engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent" was simply an incorrect statement of law.
Brgoch. slip op. at 2. The court reasoned that the general rule is that the principal is liable for
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during the existence of an agency
relationship and within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority. Brgoch, slip op.
at 1. Furthermore, the court of appeals held that questions of fact remained as to the existence
of the agency relationship between Harry and Private Ledger and the scope of Harry's apparent
authority. The court of appeals stated that whether an agency relationship exists and the extent
of that agency relationship are generally questions of fact in all but the clearest cases. Brgoch,
3

slip op. at 2. Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in Private Ledger's petition for writ of certiorari is
misleading for two reasons. First, that statement of facts does not set forth all facts "relevant
to the issues presented for review" as required by Rule 49(a)(8) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Second, Private Ledger's statement of facts absolutely ignores the standard of
review which the court of appeals was required to apply in this case. This case was decided in
the trial court on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the court of appeals was required
on the appeal to view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the losing parties on
summary judgment. K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994); Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). The following facts are relevant to the
disposition of this petition and are presented as the court of appeals was required by the standard
of review to view them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.
Defendant Ronald Allen Harry ("Harry") was a registered agent and branch manager of
Defendant Private Ledger's Salt Lake City branch office from January 1988 until November
1989. Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs had utilized Harry's services at his prior brokerage firm,
Prudential Bache, and used his services at Private Ledger. (R. 493, 499-500) Brgoch and
Isaacs were retired airline pilots, had been long-time friends and had many similar interests (R.
494, 500) Harry managed their retirement portfolios while he worked as the branch manager
at the Salt Lake City office of Private Ledger (R. 600, 605) Harry's business cards, stationery,
and title at the office held Harry out as the branch manager of Private Ledger in Salt Lake City.
(R. 602, 607)
Despite instructions from Brgoch and Isaacs that none of their funds should be invested
4

in high-risk or partnership investments, in May of 1988, Harry invested portions of Brgoch's
and Isaacs's portfolios in an Arizona partnership which purchased unimproved real property for
potential development.2

(R. 436, 453, 600-02, 605-07) Harry, without the knowledge or

permission of either Brgoch or Isaacs, caused substantial amounts of their IRA funds to be
transferred from their Private Ledger account to a bank in Onaga, Kansas. (R. 600, 605) This
transfer was effectuated only because Harry forged the plaintiffs' signatures on transfer
documents.

(R.601-02, 606-07)

Brgoch and Isaacs, not sophisticated or knowledgeable

investors by any definition, were not provided with a prospectus or an explanation of the
investment and were only told that the investment was short term, low risk, and provided
suitable returns.3 (R. 600-01, 605-06) Brgoch and Isaacs were given this information only after
Harry made the investment and transferred the funds. Brgoch and Isaacs did not find out about
the forged documents until some time later. (R. 601-02, 606-07) Brgoch and Isaacs were told
that the investment was a one-time-only investment which would require no further investment
on their part. (R. 600, 605) In actuality, the investment required annual assessments of $17,000
to be contributed by each investor over a period of up to thirteen years. When notice of the first

2

The limited partnership in which Harry invested plaintiffs' money, Red River Mountain Limited
Partnership ("Red River"), was not approved by Private Ledger. According to Private Ledger, agents
were not permitted to sell securities which had not been approved by Private Ledger unless the agent
received permission. An agent's sale of unapproved securities is referred to as "selling away." State v
Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
3

Private Ledger's petition refers to Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs as "experienced investors." Petition
at 3. However, Private Ledger fails to disclose that this issue was presented to the trial court which ruled
that the issue was one of material fact. (R. 285) When an issue is resolved by the trial court against a
party, that party should raise the issue on direct or cross-appeal. State v. South. 885 P.2d 795, 798
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert granted. 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); and Henrettv v. Manti City Corp.. 791
P.2d 506, 511 (Utah 1990). Private Ledger did not appeal or cross-appeal the trial court's disposition
of this issue. Because this issue was decided by the trial court adversely to Private Ledger, Private
Ledger should not now be stating facts which are contrary to the court's ruling which it did not dispute.
5

assessments arrived, Brgoch and Isaacs complained to Harry. Harry told Brgoch and Isaacs to
ignore the assessment, that a mistake had been, and that he would take care of the matter. (R.
601, 606) Harry was later charged with various criminal securities violations and was convicted
of four counts of securities fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-1 and -21 (1989), and
his conviction was subsequently affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals in April, 1994. State
v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The first three counts pertained to criminal
conduct Harry against three individual investors, including Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs. 873
P.2d at 1155. The fourth count on which Harry was convicted alleged that Harry committed
fraud against Private Ledger. 873 P.2d at 1156. On appeal, Harry challenged this count, but
the conviction was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals which held that Private Ledger had
suffered harm at Harry's hands because it did not receive commissions that ordinarily would be
due it and because Private Ledger would be exposed to "potential lawsuits from disgruntled
investors," such as Brgoch and Isaacs, due to Harry's actions. 873 P.2d at 1157.
In its motion for summary judgment, Private Ledger argued that Harry was prevented
by an agreement with Private Ledger from selling the kind of investments which he sold Brgoch
and Isaacs. Private Ledger claimed that Harry did not have the authority to invest clients' funds
in Red River. (R. 415) In response to the motion for summary judgment, Brgoch and Isaacs
argued that they believed Harry was acting on behalf of Private Ledger and under the authority
granted to him by Private Ledger. Both Brgoch and Isaacs provided affidavits that stated that
Harry held himself out as manager of the Salt Lake office of Private Ledger and that their
dealings with Harry occurred at the Salt Lake offices of Private Ledger. (R. 601, 602, 606,
607) Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs each received statements from Private Ledger noting that
funds and been transferred from their account. Finally, both Brgoch and Isaacs affirmatively
6

stated that they were never told that Harry was acting as any type of independent contractor and
that they were only told and informed by Harry's business cards, letterhead, and office notations
that Harry was the manager of the Private Ledger Salt Lake City branch. (R. 602, 607)
Furthermore, another broker in the Salt Lake City office, Cregg Cannon, provided an affidavit
which stated that Cannon had raised the issue of selling outside limited partnerships to officials
of Private Ledger on at least one occasion and that he was led to believe that Private Ledger,
while not officially sanctioning the conduct, would "look the other way" when such conduct
occurred. (R. 618-19) Cannon specifically stated, "My impression was that they [Private
Ledger] didn't care about such action and that the action went on from various representatives
and that if, in fact, I sold private securities they didn't want to know or be informed about those
sales." (R. 619) Cannon also stated that Private Ledger's supervision over its agents and
officers was nonexistent. (R. 619) Such nonexistent supervision facilitated Private Ledger's
position of not wanting to know the actions of its agents/managers. Therefore, Brgoch and
Isaacs argued that Harry had apparent authority to make all the investments which were made
from funds in their accounts. (R. 595-96, 686-93) The trial court rejected these arguments.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN THIS CASE WAS
CORRECT BECAUSE PRIVATE LEDGER'S CLAIM DEPENDS
ON DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.
Nowhere in its petition does Private Ledger state that the court of appeals was
constrained by the standard of review to view the facts of the case in the light most favorable

7

to the losing parties in the trial court, Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs.4 When the court of appeals
found disputed issues of material fact to exist, it was required to reverse the summary judgment.
Private Ledger's petition for writ of certiorari in this Court seems to indicate that the court of
appeals decided important legal questions which have seemingly broad application far beyond
the ambit of this case. However, in reality, the court of appeals' decision stands for two narrow
propositions. First, the court of appeals held that whether an agency relationship exists and the
scope of the agent's authority are questions of fact to be decided by the trier of fact in all but
the clearest cases. Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Secondly, the court of appeals decided that "Questions
of fact remain as to the existence of the agency relationship between Harry and [Private Ledger]
and the scope of Harry's authority." Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Simply stated, all the court of
appeals decided was that the trial court should not have decided this case on summary judgment.
A comparison of the facts set forth by Private Ledger in its petition and the facts set forth
in this brief in opposition reveals the accuracy of the court of appeals' holding. For example,
Private Ledger's petition states, "The transfer of plaintiffs' funds to bank accounts in their name
in Kansas was entirely proper." Petition at 5. In fact, Private Ledger fails to disclose that the
transfer was effectuated only because its agent, Defendant Harry, forged the plaintiffs' signatures
on the transfer documents. (R. 601-02, 606-07) The issue of whether the forgery could have
been spotted by comparison of the signatures on the transfer documents to plaintiffs' actual
signatures on file with Private Ledger has not yet been the subject of discovery in this case.

4

At one point in its petition, Private Ledger claims that the court of appeals failed to "adhere to Rule
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . . . ." Petition at 10. In fact, Private Ledger fails to
acknowledge that plaintiffs submitted affidavits pertaining to the issues on summary judgment. Thus the
requirements of Rule 56(e) were clearly satisfied. See, ej^, Thavne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d
120, 124 (Utah 1994) (Rule 56 (e) only requires the nonmoving party to produce some evidence, such
as affidavits, in response to a summary judgment motion.)
8

Private Ledger now knows that the transfer was effectuated only through its agent's fraud. At
another point, Private Ledger states, "[Plaintiffs] do not contend that Private Ledger had any
knowledge of the Red River investments prior to or at the time those investments were made."
Petition at 5. This statement overlooks the larger issue of "selling away" and ignores evidence
presented to the trial court by the plaintiffs which indicated that Private Ledger was aware of
the practice of "selling away" by its agents and did little to control the practice. (R. 618-19)
These instances demonstrate that disputed issues of fact remain regarding virtually all of the
issues in this case and that summary judgment should have been foreclosed, as the court of
appeals correctly held.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
TRIAL COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE APPLICABLE LAW
ON THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY.
The main thrust of Private Ledger's petition in this Court is that the court of appeals did
not properly apply the doctrine of apparent authority and that it misconstrued one of its own
cases and ignored cases from other jurisdictions. Each of these claims is wrong.
A*

The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that the Trial Court Ignored the Doctrine of
Apparent Authority In Its Ruling on the Summary Judgment Motion.
When it ruled in favor of Private Ledger, the trial court erroneously focused on the

actions of Defendant Harry with respect to Private Ledger rather on the authority apparent to
plaintiffs which Private Ledger had bestowed upon Harry, its agent. In addition, the trial court
misinterpreted the law when it relied on the fact that Private Ledger had also been a victim of
Defendant Harry. In ruling in favor of Defendant Harry, the trial court stated:
. . . In essence, it appears that when a registered representative of a
brokerage firm clearly violates the firm's policies and engages in unauthorized
9

activities without the knowledge of Private Ledger in this matter, I just cannot see
how liability can be imposed upon the principal, Private Ledger, in this matter.
The fact that Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of defrauding Private
Ledger crystallizes my opinion in that one cannot be an agent of the principal at
the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent. They are
mutually exclusive actions and terms.
(R. 847-48) This reasoning was also incorporated into the trial court's written order. (R. 821)
In reversing the trial court's summary judgment, the court of appeals stated that the trial
court produced no authority to support the proposition that "one cannot be an agent of the
principal at the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as to Private
Ledger." Brgoch, slip op. at 1. The court of appeals also said it was aware of no such
authority. Rather, the court of appeals stated that "The general rule is that a principal is liable
for injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during the existence of the agency
and within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority." Brgoch, slip op. at 1 (citations
omitted). Finally, the court of appeals stated, "Simply because the agent commits an act that
is criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all responsibility vis-a-vis an
innocent third party." Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Applying these principles, the court of appeals
concluded that the trial court incorrectly reasoned that Harry could not be an agent of Private
Ledger if he engaged in conduct which was criminally fraudulent. Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Now,
in its petition to this Court, Private Ledger argues that the court of appeals somehow misapplied
agency concepts in its decision. Private Ledger's assertion is simply incorrect.
The trial court's ruling totally discounted the concept of apparent authority. An agency
relationship arises when one party, the principal, demonstrates an intention that another party,
the agent, shall act on his behalf. The statements or actions of the agent can bind the principal.
United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d 927, 931 (7th Cir. 1990). The principal can invest an agent
10

with at least two types of authority. "Actual" authority is "That authority the agent reasonable
thinks she possesses based on the principal's dealings with her." Select Creations. Inc. v.
Paliafito America. Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1223, 1233 (E.D. Wis. 1993). If an agent lacks actual
authority to perform specific actions, the agent's actions may still bind the principal, if the agent
has apparent authority. "Apparent" authority "arises when the agent does not possess actual or
implied authority to act for the principal in the matter, but the principal has clothed the agent
with apparent authority to act for the principal in that particular act. In other words, the
principal permits the agent to appear to have the authority to bind the principal." Badger v.
Paulson Inv. Co.. 803 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Or. 1991). Utah has long recognized the concept of
apparent authority. See, e j ^ , Santi v. Denver & Rio Grande Western RR Co.. 442 P.2d 921,
923 n.3 (Utah 1968) ("[Principals are generally bound by acts of their agents which fall within
the apparent scope of their authority and will be bound where innocent third parties have dealt
with the agent in good faith."); Harrison v. Auto Securities Co.. 257 P. 677 (Utah 1927).
In correcting the trial court's misapplication of the law, the court of appeals applied its
prior case of Horrocks v. Westfalia Svstemat. 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Horrocks.
which is discussed below, held that basic agency law requires that the principal be bound by the
acts of an agent clothed with apparent authority even when the agent's acts adversely impact the
principal. 892 P.2d at 15. In Horrocks. the court of appeals stated that if a loss is to be
suffered because of the misconduct of an agent, the loss should be "borne by those who put it
in his power to do the wrong." 892 P.2d at 16-17. The court of appeals correctly applied
Horrocks to this case in its analysis of the trial court's actions.
The trial court's concerns that Private Ledger had also been a victim of Harry's
fraudulent activities and that Private Ledger attempted to control Harry are clearly contrary to
11

Horrocks and other authorities.

Indeed, there is ample support for the proposition that

misconduct by the agent against innocent third parties will bind the principal even if the principal
does not benefit or is harmed by the agent's misconduct or even if the misconduct is specifically
forbidden by the principal.
For example, the Restatement (Second) of Agency §161 (1958), plainly states that a
principal can be responsible for the acts of an agent even where the acts are forbidden by the
principal. The Restatement provides:
A general agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal subjects his
principal to liability for acts done on his account which usually accompany or are
incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct if, although
they are forbidden by the principal, the other party reasonably believes the agent
is authorized to do them and has no notice that he is not so authorized.
Courts have applied this provision to situations identical to the one in this case to find a
brokerage firm liable.
For example, in Hollowav v. Howerdd. 536 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976) the 6th
Circuit cited §161 of the Restatement as a basis for imposing liability on a brokerage firm when
its agent, acting on his own volition, sold unregistered stock, a situation identical to this case.
The court held, inter alia, that those purchasers of the unregistered stock "knew of [the agent's]
status with [the brokerage firm] and who were without knowledge that he was acting separately
from [the brokerage firm] were permitted to recover [from the brokerage firm]." 536 F.2d at
696. In explaining the basis for its holding, the court stated:
The liability of [the brokerage firm] is premised in the theory that 'if one appoints
an agent to conduct a series of transactions over a period of time, it is fair that
he should bear losses that are incurred when such an agent, although without
authority to do so, does something which is usually done in connection with the
transactions he is employed to conduct.'
There was no proof that [the brokerage firm] 'usually' engaged in the sale
of unregistered stock.
12

[The brokerage firm], however, had an affirmative obligation to prevent
the use of the prestige of its firm to defraud the investing public. When its agents
are dealing individually in the sale of securities [the brokerage firm] must be
clearly disassociated from those transactions, as otherwise it will incur liability
on the basis of respondeat superior for the fraudulent representations of its agents.
536 F.2d at 696, citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §161, comment a (1958).
The situation described by §161 and covered by Hollowav is precisely what occurred
here. Harry was a general agent for Private Ledger. Private Ledger was a disclosed principal.
Harry's act of "selling" Red River was an act which would appear to Brgoch and Isaacs to be
in the normal course of business which Harry appeared to be authorized to perform by Private
Ledger. Therefore, even if the selling of Red River was forbidden by Private Ledger, it would
nevertheless be liable under §161 of the Restatement and the reasoning of Hollowav. To the
plaintiffs, whose point of view should have been assumed by the trial court but was not,
Defendant Harry had apparent authority derived from his managerial position with Private
Ledger to deal in the securities at issue. Brgoch and Isaacs only ever dealt with Harry at the
Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City. When they needed to contact Harry, they contacted him
at the Private Ledger office. Harry's business cards and letterhead announced Harry as manager
for the Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City. (R. 602, 607) Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs
were never informed that Harry was acting on his own behalf or even that he could have acted
on his own behalf. (R. 602, 607) For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs, Harry acted only
on behalf of Private Ledger and under its control and authority.
The trial court neglected the doctrine of apparent authority as espoused by the
Restatement and cases which support it when it granted summary judgment. The court of
appeals appropriately corrected the trial court's misunderstanding of the law.
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B.

The Court of Appeals Correctly Construed Horrocks v. Westfalia in Deciding This Case.
Private Ledger claims that the court of appeals misconstrued one of its earlier decisions

in deciding this case. In fact, when that decision is examined, it is evident that the court of
appeals not only correctly interpreted Horrocks, but that Horrocks determines the outcome of
this case. In Horrocks v. Westfalia Svstemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), which was
not available to the trial court at the time of its ruling, the plaintiff Garold Horrocks was a dairy
farmer in Wayne County, Utah. Westfalia was an Illinois company which sold dairy equipment
and Wayne Buchanan was a dealer who represented Westfalia in Utah for a number of years.
Buchanan, acting as an agent for Westfalia, entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of
several thousand dollars worth of milking equipment. Horrocks made only partial payment for
the equipment but received only part of the equipment. 892 P.2d at 15. A few months after
the contracts had been signed, Buchanan, the agent, presented Horrocks with a receipt and
acknowledgment which stated that Horrocks had in fact received all of the equipment which had
been ordered. Horrocks signed the acknowledgment and receipt without reading it. However,
at the time, both Horrocks and Buchanan knew that the balance of the equipment had not been
delivered. Subsequently, Buchanan presented the acknowledgment to Westfalia who in turn paid
Buchanan $14,000.00. 892 P.2d at 15. Unbeknownst to Horrocks and Westfalia, Buchanan
then left the area apparently "making off with the undelivered equipment and cash." Id. After
a few months when the balance of the equipment had not been delivered, Horrocks telephoned
Westfalia and complained. The court of appeals noted that this telephone call from Horrocks
was the first knowledge that Westfalia had that the acknowledgment presented to it by Buchanan
was false. Shortly thereafter, Horrocks filed suit against Westfalia alleging breach of contract,
and Westfalia counterclaimed for the entire amount owed under the contract.
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The court of appeals stated that the central issue in Horrocks was whether "Westfalia
should bear the responsibility for the unauthorized, adverse acts of its agent." 892 P.2d at 15.
In the case, Westfalia made the argument that Buchanan, Westfalia's agent, was acting outside
the scope of his authority, was acting in his own self-interest, and that his actions were adverse
to Westfalia. Id- This is exactly the argument which Private Ledger has made with respect to
its agent, Defendant Harry. In Horrocks, the court of appeals soundly rejected Westfalia's
argument. The court stated that basic agency law requires that a principal be bound by the acts
of an agent clothed with apparent authority. 892 P.2d at 15. The court stated that even when
an agent's acts adversely impact its principal, the principal is still liable for the agent's actions
as against an unknowing and innocent third party.5 Specifically, the court of appeals stated:
The loss that results from Buchanan's misconduct must be borne by the party who
empowered Buchanan to commit the wrong. "Where a loss is to be suffered
through the misconduct of an agent, it should be borne by those who put it in his
power to do the wrong." County of Macon v. Shores. 397 U.S. 272, 279, 24
L.ed 889, 890 (1877); see also Vickers. 607 P.2d at 607; Harrison. 257 P. at
679-80. Westfalia placed Buchanan in the position to perpetrate a fraud.
Consequently, Westfalia must bear the responsibility for Buchanan's misconduct.
The trial court did not err by placing liability on Westfalia under the theory of
apparent authority.
. . . Even when the agent is acting adversely to the principal's interest, the
knowledge of the agent may still be imputed to the principal.
892 P.2d at 16-17. The court of appeals clearly adopted the position, supported by abundant
5

This general principle of agency law, that a principal is bound by the acts of its agents as against
innocent third parties, was recognized long ago by the Utah Supreme Court. In Harrison v. Auto
Securities Co.. 257 P. 677 (Utah 1927), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is a general principle of the law of agency, running through all contracts made by
agents with third parties, that the principals are bound by the acts of their agents which
fall within the apparent scope of authority of the agents, and that the principals will not
be permitted to deny the authority of their agents against innocent third parties, who dealt
with those agents in good faith.
275 P. at 679.
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authority, that a principal who cloaks an agent with apparent authority must suffer the loss due
to an agent's misconduct even when the agent's misconduct has harmed the principal itself.
The court of appeals cited Horrocks in its opinion in this case. The similarities between
the two cases are inescapable. In Horrocks, the court of appeals analyzed the facts which led
the plaintiff to believe that Buchanan was acting within his authority when he committed the
fraudulent actions. 892 P.2d 16. In this case also, the facts are abundantly clear that the
plaintiffs perceived Defendant Harry to be cloaked with the apparent authority by Private Ledger
to invest their money in Red River. To plaintiffs, Defendant Harry had apparent authority
derived from his managerial position with Private Ledger to deal in the securities at issue.
The trial court's concerns that Private Ledger had also been a victim of Harry's
fraudulent activities and that Private Ledger attempted to control Harry are clearly contrary to
Horrocks and therefore the court of appeals was correct in relying on Horrocks to determine the
outcome of this case.
C.

Even a Cursory Examination of Casesfromother Jurisdictions Cited by Private Ledger
Demonstrates that They Do Not Support Private Ledger's Position.
In its petition to this Court, Private Ledger asserts that cases from other jurisdictions

support its position in this matter. In fact, when these cases are subjected to even modest
scrutiny, the reader quickly ascertains that those cases to not support Private Ledger's position.
The first case cited, but not discussed, by Private Ledger is Bates v. Shearson Lehman
Bros. Inc., 42 F. 3d 79 (1st Cir. 1994). That case is easily distinguishable on its facts. There,
the first circuit expressly held that there was no evidence of any representation or conduct to
suggest to the plaintiff that the agent had authority to act for the principal. The court stated that
the agent, while working for the principal, never opened an account with the principal for the

16

plaintiff. The agent always visited the plaintiff's home to procure money from her; she never
went to an office. Checks issued by the plaintiff were never made payable to the principal but
rather were always made payable to the agent's personal bank. Finally, the agent "never
expressly told or otherwise represented to [plaintiff] that her funds would be invested with [the
principal]." 42 F.3d at 82. Furthermore, the court stated that the principal had no way of
knowing of the existence of the plaintiff because the agent never opened an account for the
plaintiff. Id. Indeed, the facts of Bates seem to suggest that it is doubtful that the plaintiff even
knew that the agent worked for the principal. In contrast, in this case, Plaintiffs Brgoch and
Isaacs routinely visited Private Ledger's office when they sought to deal with Defendant Harry.
Harry's business cards and letterhead announced that he was the manager for Private Ledger.
Brgoch and Isaacs had an account with Private Ledger. Even the fraudulent transfers of funds
appeared on a Private Ledger account statement. For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs,
Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and under its control and authority. Private
Ledger's claim that this case is indistinguishable from Bates is simply incorrect.
Private Ledger also cites Hauser v. FarrelL 14 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 1994), to support its
argument. However, as Private Ledger acknowledged in its amended brief in the court of
appeals, a significant fact in Hauser distinguishes it from this case.

In Hauser. the

plaintiffs/investors "did not . . . contradict the brokers' representations that they told the
customer that the [investment] would not be through [the brokerage firm]." 14 F.3d at 1433.
In other words, unlike this case where Defendant Harry never informed Brgoch and Isaacs that
the investment was not sanctioned by Private Ledger nor did Private Ledger inform Brgoch and
Isaacs that Harry was acting on his own, the defendants in Hauser were specifically informed
that the defendant brokerage firm did not sanction the investment at issue in that case. In short,
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Hauser also does not provide any type of support for Private Ledger's argument.
Finally, Private Ledger's petition discusses FSC Securities Corp. v. McCormack, 630
So. 2d 979 (Miss. 1994). FSC Securities is also distinguishable from this case. Private Ledger
does not reveal that FSC Securities was an appeal from a trial, not from summary judgment as
in this case.

FSC Securities, 630 So. 2d at 980. In this case, no trial has been held.

Additionally, Private Ledger does not disclose that a determinant factor in FSC Securities, on
which the appellate court based its holding, was the fact that the plaintiffs had noticed that the
agent in that case was acting for himself rather than for defendant FSC Securities. 630 SO 2d
at 986. Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme Court cited ample evidence which supported that
conclusion. For example, as opposed to this case, the agent in FSC Securities met with the
plaintiffs at their home, not at a place of business. 630 SO 2d at 982. Also, contrary to the
facts of this case, in FSC Securities the agent's stationery and business cards contain the names
of both his own company and FSC Securities. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs in that case gave the
agent checks made out to the agent's own company, not to the defendant FSC Securities. Id.
All of the foregoing facts distinguish FSC Securities from this case. Here, plaintiffs
Brgoch and Isaacs only ever dealt with Harry at the Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City.
When they needed to contact Harry, they contacted him at the Private Ledger office. Harry's
business cards and letterhead announced Harry as the manager of the Private Ledger office in
Salt Lake City. (R. 602, 607) Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs were never informed that Harry
was acting on his own behalf or even that he could have acted on his own behalf. (R. 602, 607)
For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs, Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and
under its control and authority. The record clearly demonstrates that the transfer of funds from
plaintiffs' Private Ledger accounts was reported to plaintiffs on Private Ledger statement sheets.
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(R. 600, 605) These facts distinguish this case from FSC Securities.
D. The Court of Appeals Appropriately Corrected the Trial Court's Ruling.
Finally, Private Ledger asserts that court of appeals misconstrued the trial court's ruling
on its motion for summary judgment. In fact, as the foregoing discussion clearly illustrates, the
trial court simply overlooked or misapplied the doctrine of apparent authority in this case. The
trial court wrongly concluded that because Private Ledger had also been a "victim" of Defendant
Harry's fraud, that that fact prevented any potential liability because of Private Ledger's position
as a principal in this case. As the foregoing discussion amply illustrates, the court of appeals
corrected this major error on the part of the trial court and correctly concluded that the doctrine
of apparent authority is applicable to this case and that the scope and extent of Defendant
Harry's agency relationship with Private Ledger is a matter to be determined by the trier of fact.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Private Ledger's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of September, 1996
NYGAARD, COKE^^NCENT

RANDY B. COKE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents
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Before Judges Orme, Jackson, and Wilkins.
ORME, Presiding Judge:
The trial court granted defendants1 summary judgment motion,
concluding that Private Ledger was not liable, as a matter of
law, for the acts or omissions of defendant Harry. In its order
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the trial court
explained that "one cannot be an agent of the principal at the
same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as
to Private Ledger." However, the trial court cited no authority
in support of this proposition and we are aware of none. Nor
have defendants called our attention to any such authority.
Rather, the general rule is that a principal is liable for
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during
the existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent' s
actual or apparent authority. See Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 161 (1958); Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 15-16
(Utah App. 1995); Poulsen v. Treasure State Indus.. Tnrir 626

P.2d 822, 829 (Mont. 1981). Moreover, whether an agency
relationship exists and the scope of the agent's authority are
questions of fact to be determined by a jury in all but the
clearest cases. Car-ill. Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co.. 891 P.2d
57, 62 (Wyo. 1995); Mauch v. Kissling. 783 P.2d 601, 605 (Wash.
App. 1989). Simply because the agent commits an act that is
criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all
responsibility vis-a-vis an innocent third party.
In this case, the trial court's reasoning that "one cannot
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in conduct
which is criminally fraudulent," is simply not a correct
statement of the law. Questions of fact remain as to the
existence of the agency relationship between Harry and defendants
and the scope of Harry's authority.
Nor are we able to sustain the judgment on the alternative
ground urged by defendants before the trial court, namely that
plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
While traditional application of the discovery rule might suggest
the claims are time-barred given plaintiffs' concession that they
knew of some wrongdoing immediately upon receipt of the first
statement sent by the Bank of Onaga, the result is otnerwise
given the contention that Harry fraudulently concealed his
misdeeds. See Berenda v. Lanaford, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
1996). See also S t a ^ v. Harry. 873 P.2d 1149, 1156 (Utah App.
1994) (noting that "Harry deceived [plaintiffs] both before and
after the transaction" in question).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants and remand the case for a trial
on the merits or such other proceedings as may now be
appropriate.

Gregory K^Orme,
Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
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